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SOME THOUGHTS ON PERSPECTIVEt
STEPHEN PEPPER*

To risk a dangerous paraphrase, it is a Bill of Rights we are
interpreting, and that fact has consequences for interpretation.
Just as with Chief Justice Marshall's reminder that it was a constitution being interpreted,' the intended function of the document is important in determining its meaning and application.
The function of a Bill of Rights is to protect the minority-or
the individual-from that majority (or coalition of minorities)
which is the government; to provide shelter for the minority
from the majority acting through the government. And from
the perspective of the minority, that shelter is important
whether the impingement by government is intentional or
inadvertent. Thus, in interpreting the free exercise clause of
the first amendment, the question of perspective is important.
Do we perceive the issue from the perspective of the minority,
or from that of the government?
Consider Frances Quaring, a Nebraska farm wife whose
religious beliefs prohibit her use of photographs, "graven
images" to her.' The state of Nebraska requires the driver's
photograph to be on a driver's license, and prohibits driving
without a valid driver's license. To follow both her religion and
the law leaves Mrs. Quaring isolated on her farm; prohibited by
her government from using an automobile, the primary mechanism of mobility in this country and the only one practically
available to her. From the perspective of the government the
driver's license law is perfectly neutral and rational, and has
nothing to do with religion. From Mrs. Quaring's perspective,
this law directly impinges on her religion; from her perspective
it is oppression based upon exercise of religion.
A reasonable and flexible government should have little
trouble seeing the problem from Mrs. Quaring's perspective
and granting her an exception. But government, particularly
t This paper is an elaboration of oral comments presented at a
conference on the religion clauses held at the Notre Dame Law School,
March 30 through April 1, 1989.
*
Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
2.

Quaringv. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8thCir. 1984), aff'd by an equally

divided court in Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985) (per curiam).
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bureaucratic government, is not always reasonable, and frequently is not flexible. Nebraska granted no exception. The
first amendment protects the "free exercise of religion." In
applying that protection to Frances Quaring do we take her
perspective or the government's; do we see neutrality or
oppression? The function of a Bill of Rights as protecting the
minority suggests, at least initially, that the minority perspective on the governmental action at issue is appropriate. From
Mrs. Quaring's perspective this legal regulation is not neutral;
it impacts upon her life and the exercise of her religion in a way
entirely incommensurate with both its effect on others and with
the intention of the legislature.
Current free exercise doctrine mandates that the individual's perspective be taken into account. Because the law
impinges significantly upon Mrs. Quaring's practice of her religion, and because excepting her from the effect of the law does
no significant damage to the interests served by the photo
requirement, exemption for her from the requirement may be
constitutionally compelled under the first amendment's guaranty of freedom of religion.' This current interpretation of the
free exercise clause, allowing in some cases for exemption from
laws which remain applicable to those with no religious objection, is what Professor West finds objectionable. I shall address4
below three of the arguments which are central to his critique,
and which I believe fail to take account of the importance of
perspective and of the function of a Bill of Rights.5
I.

MAJORITY AND MINORITY

If one of the purposes of the religion clauses is to equalize
minority and majority (or a coalition of minorities) in regard to
the nexus between government and religion, then both
intended and unintended governmental imposition on religion
must be within the protection of the amendment.6 The major3. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't. of Employment Security, U.S. 109 S.
Ct. 1514 (1989); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Eighth Circuit
held that an exemption for Mrs. Quaring was required, Quaring v. Peterson,
728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984) and this was affirmed by an equally divided
Supreme Court, Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam).
4. West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).

5.

Some of the arguments and observations presented below are

elaborated in Pepper, A Brieffor the Free Exercise Clause, forthcoming in J.L. &
RELIGION.

6.

Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966
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ity (or a coalition of minorities) will not pass laws that impinge
on their own religion intentionally, but they also will not do so
inadvertently. (As Professor West quotes: "If Catholic orJewish beliefs prohibited photos on drivers' licenses, would they be
required?") 7 The smaller the minority, the more likely that
inadvertent imposition will occur. And the smaller the minority, the more likely that inadvertent imposition will change to
uncaring imposition if the matter is brought up. The first
amendment, under this view, provides to small minorities the
same protection in regard to freedom of religion that larger
minorities and majorities receive through the political process."
Perspective is thus important, if not determinative. Professor West's response to this majority/minority equalizing interpretation of the religion clauses is therefore quite revealing:
"There are now no majority religions in America, unless one is
willing to ignore all the many different varieties of Christianity
that exist in this country." 9 Can one not recognize the "many
varieties of Christianity," yet still understand that they function
as a homogenous "majority" in regard to most enacted law and
its effect on minority religions? Professor West's contrary view,
which I found surprising (to say the least), is indeed likely to
lead to the kind of constricted interpretation of the free exercise clause which he suggests. If there is no majority (or coalition of minorities behaving as a majority), then there is
obviously little need for a Bill of Rights.
It is also a view which I would suggest only a member of
the Protestant Christian majority would have; a view quite different from that likely to be held by one who is not a Protestant, and certainly quite different from one who is not a
Christian. Because it exemplifies how majorities-the "ins"can simply fail to perceive the "outs," it also demonstrates why
the first amendment's protection is necessary both for intentional discrimination and unintentional, the failure to notice
that what one perceives as harmless to oneself may be quite
Wis. L. REV. 217, 291; Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986
B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 312-16.
7. West, supra note 4, at 617 n.121 (quoting Pepper, supra note 6, at

313).
8.

This comment is not the place for the full argument supporting an

interpretation of the free exercise clause which includes exemption from
otherwise "neutral" laws. For defenses of this view, see Pepper, supra notes 5
and 6. See also Gedicks, Towards a ConstitutionalJurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99 (1989); Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of

Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sue.
9. West, supra note 4, at 617.

HARV.

L.

CT. REV.

REV.

1.

933 (1989);
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harmful to another.'" It is, in addition, a perspective which
leaves out the reality of local majorities. I grew up as a nonMormon in Utah, and can assure Professor West that !that state
has a functioning religious majority in regard to government.
My first teaching position was at the University of Arkansas in
Fayetteville, and I can assure him that that region of the country-sometimes called the "Bible Belt"-also has a religious
majority which often affects government.
Before moving on, it should also be noted that Professor
West's arguments against the minority/majority equalizing
interpretation of the religion clauses are based entirely upon
observations that suggest minorities in general, not just religious
minorities, do not need special protection because the structure of our government and the realities of pluralist politics
sufficiently disperse and diffuse power. This may or may not be
true. But it is important to understand how far-reaching the
suggestion is. It applies to all provisions of a Bill of Rights, not
just the free exercise clause. It leads to the conclusion that no
provision in the Bill of Rights need be interpreted as intended
to protect minorities and individuals from majorities and government, because under this view no such protection is
needed." Both the adoption of the Bill of Rights itself and its
modern constitutional interpretation are premised on a rejection of this point of view.
II. NEUTRALITY
Professor West's first argument against exemptions is
based upon the asserted principle that laws must be neutral in
regard to religion and religions if they are to be constitutional
under the first amendment.' 2 As the preceding discussion
should have demonstrated, neutrality is a matter of perspective. What from one perspective is a religiously neutral and
eminently rational law concerning photos on drivers' licenses,
10.

For a discussion of a similar set of issues

concerned with

perspective, see Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10

(1987).
11. James Madison at one time held this view, believing that because
the federal government had only limited, specifically delineated powers
under the Constitution, no bill of rights was needed. But its absence was
much remarked upon during debates over ratification, and several state
ratifying conventions requested such amendments to the Constitution
(including Virginia). Madison, as it happened, took a leading role in the
framing of the Bill of Rights. See generally, L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM 125-27 (rev. ed. 1967).
12. West, supra note 4, at 600-02. For a discussion of neutrality in
religion clause doctrine, see McConnell, supra note 8, at 8-13.
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from Mrs. Quaring's perspective is a drastic governmental
restraint on her freedom because of her religious beliefs. What
we see as a religiously neutral law mandating school attendance, the Amish see as oppression which prevents them from
following the dictates of their religion.' 3
When seeking neutrality in regard to the nexus between
law and religious practice, should one be looking primarily at
the language of the provision, the intention of the lawmaker, or
the consequences for the believer? Neutrality being in the eye
of the beholder, the function of a Bill of Rights suggests that
one hesitate before ignoring the minority's perception of a lack
of neutrality. By mandating exceptions from some laws for
some religious believers in appropriate circumstances, the first
amendment can be seen to create equality, not undermine it.
Exceptions create an equality in the religious impact of law.
For almost everyone, mandatory public schooling or
mandatory photos on driver's licenses has no religious impact. An
exemption equalizes that lack of effect for the small minority
upon whom there is a significant, unintended religious impact.
The exemption leads to the religiously neutral result that there
is equality in the religious impact of the law.
Excepting the religious minority from a legal provision
thus creates equality and neutrality with respect to religion. The
inequality which is so troubling, and which is the concern of
those who see a lack of "neutrality" in such exemptions, is in
regard to the secular effects and purposes of the legislation.
That inequality is clearly trivial in regard to the Nebraska
driver's license law; no one is going to feel deprived because
their license must have a photo while Mrs. Quaring's need not.
And there are so few who will seek an exception to the law that
there will be no significant detriment to the effectiveness of the
law in general. The same is true of exempting the Amish from
the final two years of mandatory schooling. Very few want to
avoid that law, and very few see any injustice or unfairness or
lack of equality in fashioning an exception based upon the
unique situation of the Amish. But this will not always be true
of religion-based exemptions.
As the paragraph above suggests, if exceptions to "neutral" laws create equality in religious impact, and thus neutrality in regard to governmental impingement on religion, our
13. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). I have discussed this case
and the background of free exercise doctrine at some length in Pepper,
Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternativesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH
L. REv. 309 (1981).
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"neutrality" concerns are diverted to two aspects of the secular
effects of the law at issue. First, will exemptions significantly
impede the government in reaching the purposes or goals of
the law? That question is quite clearly part of the current first
amendment doctrine on exemptions, the "compelling interest"
balancing test. Rendering a law religiously "neutral" in impact
through constitutionally mandated exceptions is only required
if it does not do too much harm to the government's secular
purpose for the law. 1 4 Second, will the exemption (required
for religious equality) create a significant secular inequality? As
noted, the inequality is of little consequence in cases such as
photos on drivers' licenses or the attendance of Amish children
for the last two years of mandatory schooling; but it may be
quite important in cases such as exemptions from taxation or
from penalties for racial discrimination in private education.15
As with the first question, this issue moves us beyond Professor
West's surface focus on neutrality and into the specifics of a
balancing test.' 6
Note that as between religions and religious believers, a
first amendment doctrine that requires exemptions is neutral:
all believers get the benefit of the doctrine if a legal provision
impinges on their religious practice in a way that meets the
requirements of the balancing test. Obviously it is the minority
which will benefit most from such a doctrine, for majorities are
unlikely to impinge on their own religious practices or that of
large minorities. (For example, the Catholic church did not
need first amendment shelter for the use of sacramental wine
during prohibition; the exception was granted in the legislation.17) But the result remains equality and neutrality among
religions in regard to legal impositions on religious practice.
The inequality and lack of neutrality is between those with reli14.

See, e.g., the cases cited at note 3, supra.

15.

See Pepper, supra note 6, at 325-31.

16. Professor West notes, West, supra note 4, at 607, n.76, smaller
religions tend to benefit more from exemption doctrine than do larger
religions. This makes sense for two reasons related to the discussion above.
First, the larger the religion, the more likely that it will protect itself through
the political process, and thus have no need for judicial protection under the
Bill of Rights. Second, the smaller the religion, the less damage an

exemption will cause the governmental interests served by the legal provision
at issue, and thus it is less likely that the government can show the required

"compelling interest" in denying an exemption. Quaring provides a good
example of both: a very small religion with no political clout and hence no

legislative exemption, but a corresponding lack of any significant negative
effect on the state's interests in photos on drivers' licenses.
17. National Prohibition Act, 27 U.S.C. § 12 (1927).
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gious objections to the effect of a law and those who object on
bases other than religious practice.
Professor West is troubled by this inequality, as well as that
between religions:
Inevitably... when the government gives exemptions to
some religious persons that it does not give to all, that
constitutes special or favored treatment for their religion
or for them because of their religion.Is
But that would seem to be exactly what the text of the first
amendment calls for.' 9 It does give special protection to religion, a guaranty of free exercise that is not gianted to other
kinds or areas of human action other than speech, press, and
assembly, while also imposing a special disability on religion
not imposed on anything else, namely the ban on religious
establishments. Professor West's answer to this textual problem for his position takes us to section IV of his paper.
III.

"ORIGINAL MEANING" AND THE DOMAIN OF RELIGION

The final section of Professor West's paper is an historical,
originalist argument against the possibility of exceptions being
mandated under the free exercise clause."0 Neither the
Enlightenment nor the radical Protestant streams of thought
contemplated religious exemptions, suggests Professor West,
but they did agree that religion was an area in which the state
had no power to legislate. The coherence of that understanding as a guide to interpretation of the first amendment depends
upon agreement over what the realm of religion covers, what is
within the realm of the state, and the absence of an overlap.
But there is manifestly both an absence of such agreement and
an overlap. Thus perspective again becomes the determining
factor: from whose viewpoint do we determine what is in the
realm of religion and what is in the realm of government? Professor West, with his majoritarian perspective, simply assumes
that the majority or governmental perspective as to the dividing line is appropriate. Because the freedom granted is in a Bill
of Rights, a document designed to protect the minority from
the point of view of the majority translated into law, his
assumption may well be wrong.
Is marriage within the realm of the state or the sphere of
religion? The answer is clear: both. The Mormons saw polyg18.
19.
20.

West, supra note 4, at 600.
See infra note 26.
West, supra note 4, at 623, pt. IV.

656

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

amy as a religious command and the federal bigamy law as
intruding into the sphere of religion; the federal Congress saw
marriage law as within the domain of the state. Was the
criminalization of bigamy an impingement upon the free exercise of religion as applied to Mormon polygamy? 2 ' West's
observation that the important historical figures all agreed with
Locke that the civil magistrate had no jurisdiction in religious
matters simply reframes the question, rather than provides an
22

answer.

Formal education of children may be an even better example. Two and three hundred years ago it was clearly within the
sphere of religion; there was no such thing as secular or public
education. Now education is primarily within the realm of the
government. Elected school boards govern public education,
and states regulate private education. For the Amish (among
many others) education remains crucial to religion and clearly
within its domain. Who is right? 23 And where would Roger
Williams, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson place it?
The education example also highlights a more general difficulty. In an age of limited government, and in the framing of
a constitution on the assumption of distinct and limited powers
for government, the notion of government and religion as governing separate spheres is at least conceivable. In the age of
the bureaucratic-regulatory state, with its ubiquity of law, regulation, and government, that conception strains the imagination. The requirement that you have a government license with
your likeness on it before you can use a vehicle, and governmental limits on the hours of work and wages (among a myriad
of other possible examples), certainly would startle the historical figures summoned and cited by Professor West. Might not
the manifest radical expansion of the realm of the state and the
21. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Supreme
Court held Mormon polygamy unprotected by the first amendment. I discuss

the case at some length in Pepper, supra note 13, at 317-26.
22. This example also shows that neutrality is not always an easy
criterion to apply under the free exercise clause. The statute was religiously
neutral in its terms, and bigamy was a traditional and long-standing crime.
But this particular statute was clearly aimed by Congress at the Mormons.

The federal Congress had refrained from criminalizing polygamy in the Utah
territory before the Civil War because of concern that this would be a
precedent in regard to federal authority over slavery in the territories. Both
were categorized as "domestic institutions." See Linford, The Mormons and the
Law: The Polygamy Cases, Part I, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 309-23 (1964).
23. The Supreme Court, applying the free exercise clause, held that
mandatory school attendance laws could not be applied to the Amish after
eighth grade. See Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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consequent radical shrinkage of the domain of religion, under
Professor West's assumption that the realms are separate and
do not overlap, lead those figures to an interpretation of "free
exercise of religion" which includes the possibility of constitutionally mandated exceptions to at least some of the welter of
laws under the current regulatory state? After all, it is a constitution we are interpreting, and the contemporary reach of governmental regulation bears little resemblance to that of two
hundred years ago.2 4
It should also be noted, before leaving this aspect of Professor West's argument, that the asserted unanimity of thought
on the question of exceptions from neutral law is probably illusory. Locke and Jefferson certainly understood the issue as
West has presented it, and narrowed the realm of religion quite
drastically to belief and opinion.2 5 Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom protected the freedom "to profess,
and by argument to maintain .

.

. opinions in matters of reli-

gion," and stated that "it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when
principles break out into overt acts against peace and good
order." But this limit, although available as a model, was not
transferred into the first amendment; the language of which is
far more absolute.2 6 In addition to Jefferson's Bill, other contemporary documents provided clear models for such limiting
language which could have been, but were not, used to limit
the reach of the free exercise clause.2 7
The absence of such a limit may be explained in part by the
fact that Madison, who had a more important role in framing
24.

The general limits and weaknesses of the originalist stance

Professor West assumes in Part IV have been well developed, and debated,
by others. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). See also Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion
Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 683 (1990), and Valauri,
Everson v. Brown: Hermeneutics, Framers' Intent, and the Establishment Clause, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 661 (1990) for a discussion of this

question.
25. See M. MALBIN, RELIGION

AND POLITICS

28-36 (1978); Little, Thomas

Jefferson's Religious Views and Their Influence on the Supreme Court's Interpretation of

the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 57 (1976).
26. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."

27. The 1787 Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest
Territory, for example, provided in part: "No person, demeaning himself in a
peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of
worship, or religious sentiments, in said territory." Quoted in 1 A. STOKES,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES

480 (1950) (emphasis added).
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the first amendment than anyone else,2 8 seems to have had a
far more expansive understanding of the realm of religion and
its attendant freedom from government imposition. His suggested language for the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights
stated:
[A]ll men are entitled to the full and free exercise of
[religion] according to the dictates of conscience; and
therefore that no man or class of men ought on account
of religion to be .

.

. subject to any penalties or disabili-

ties, unless under color of religion the preservation of
equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly
endangered.2 9
This language is more compatible with an exemption interpretation of "free exercise" than it is with a "facial neutrality of the
law" interpretation, and is strikingly parallel to the current
"compelling interest" balancing test. Madison was consistent
over the years in articulating a very broad understanding of
freedom of religion. In the first substantive paragraph of his
famous Remonstrance (1785) he asserted:
This duty [religion] is precedent, both in order of
time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil
Society . . . We maintain therefore that in matters of

Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance. 30 (emphasis added)
Application of either the 1776 or the 1785 passage to
questions of exemption for the Amish from mandatory public
education laws, exemption for the Mormons from bigamy law,
or exemption for Mrs. Quaring from the driver's license photo
requirement, leads to a rather different conclusion than does
application of the language and thought of Jefferson and
Locke. And if one is looking for a gloss for the free exercise
clause, James Madison was far more involved in the framing
and drafting of the first amendment than was Jefferson. 3 '
28. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 1, 33-47 (1947); W.L.
MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 77-150

(1985); 1 A.

STOKES,

supra note 27, at 339-50 (1950).

29. Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, AM. HIST. A. ANN. REP.
FOR THE YEAR 1901, at 166-67 (1902).
30. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), reprinted in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (R.S. Alley ed. 1985), at 55, 56.
31.
Madison was educated at Princeton in a politically active and
vibrant strand of dissenting protestantism, and seems to have been far more
intricately connected than Jefferson to the Christian intellectual tradition and
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Whether the domain of religion is to be decided on some
general, categorical, large-scale basis (and thus probably from
a majoritarian point of view) or on a case by case basis taking
into account the view of minorities under the specific law at
issue, is one of the underlying issues both of first amendment
interpretation and of the question of constitutionally mandated
exemptions for religious exercise. It is a question of perspective, and a question not answered by the premise that the government has no authority to legislate in the area of religion.

also to have been less hostile to religion than Jefferson. See W.L. MILLER,
THE FIRST LIBERTY, supra note 28, at 87-95 (1985); Little, supra note 25.

